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1 Introduction 
The purpose in this paper is twofold. First, we build a search and matching 
model that is able to replicate the magnitude and cyclical behavior of job 
creation, destruction and reallocation l rates in a segmented labor market like 
the one in Spain. Second, we quantify the effects of a reduction in firing costs 
associated with permanent jobs for the magnitude and cyclical behavior of 
job creation, destruction and reallocation rates, the temporary employment 
rate and the job conversion rate from temporary into permanent contracts. 
The motivation of the paper is the similarity in the cyclical behavior of 
US and Spanish job creation (JC), destruction (JD) and reallocation (JR) 
rates despite the differences in job security regulations (see Table 1). In par-
ticular, job reallocation rates are countercyclical in both labor markets. 
Tabla 1: JC, JD and JR correlations with the cycle (NET)2 
Country (period) Corr(JC,NET) Corr(JD,NET) Corr( JR,NET) 
US (1972-1986) 0.90 -0.958 -0.519 
Spain (1990-1996) 0.602 -0.895 -0.531 
This observation is inconsistent with one of the main conclusions drawn 
from the recent literature on job creation and job destruction in the OECD3 , 
i.e., countries with higher firing costs tend to have lower correlations of JR 
rate with the cycle. This regularity seems to be validated except for Spain 
(see this in Table 2, where some OECD countries have been ordered according 
to the stringency in job security provisions). 
According to this literature, the countercyclical behavior of job realloca-
tion rates in Anglo-xason countries is due to negligible firing costs. These 
economies are considered more efficient in the sense that they are able to re-
allocate when the opportunity cost (in terms of output losses) is lower, that 
is, in recessions. In contrast, job reallocation rates in continental Europe are 
1 Job reallocation is defined as the sum of job creation and job destruction. 
2Notes: (1) Corr(JC, NET), Corr(JD,NET) and Corr(JR,NET) are the correlations 
of job creation, destruction and reallocation rates with net employment rate (NET), the 
indicator of the cycle. Source: USA, Davis et al.(1996); Spain, own designed using firm-
level data from the survey "Encuesta de Coyuntura Laboral". 
3See Garibaldi (1997), Garibaldi, Konings and Pissarides (1996), OECD Employment 
Outlook (1994), Millard y Mortensen (1997). 
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acyclical because high firing costs prevent the necessary reallocation from 
taking place in recessions. However, this does not seem to be the case in 
Spain. 
Table 2: Mean reallocation rate and its correlation with the cycle4 . 
Country US Canada UK Germany Norway Spain Italy 
Period 84-91 83-91 73-86 83-90 77-86 90-96 84-91 
Mean 22.0 20.0 - 12.6 - 24.0 2l.3 
Corr -0.52 -0.48 -0.95 0.04 -0.13 -0.53 0.11 
In the light of what happens in the Spanish labor market, the obvious 
question is how to reconcile this observation with the results from previous 
studies, that is, what are the factors that make it possible to have a coun-
tercyclical JR rate in a high firing costs economy. 
The answer lies on the segmentation that characterizes the Spanish la-
bor market. By looking at job creation, destruction and reallocation rates 
dissagregated by permanent (JCP, JDP, JRP) and temporary employment 
(Jet, JDt , JRt ), it is easy to see that the magnitude and cyclical behavior 
of Spanish aggregate rates are mainly due to the behavior of temporary em-
ployment (see table 3). 
Table 3: Job creation, destruction and reallocation rates in Spain5 
JC JD JR JCP JDP JRP JCt JDt JRt 
Mean 2.7 3.2 5.9 2.7 3.0 5.8 1l.9 13.1 25.0 
Corr. 0.6 -0.89 -0.53 0.24 -0.48 -0.18 0.43 -0.7 -0.36 
Temporary contracts were liberalized in Spain in 1984 and since then, 
firms have made widespread use of them6 . There are two reasons for that 
4Notes: (1) Mean stands for the annual job reallocation rate (average). (2) Corr. is 
the correlation of the job reallocation rate and net employment rate (NET). (3) The unit 
of study is the plant, except for Canada and Italy, where the unit of study is the firm. (4) 
The employment sector is manufactures, except for Spain, where services are also included. 
(5) Sources: OECD Employment Outlook and own designed 
5Notes: (1) Source: own designed with quaterly firm-level data from the survey En-
cuesta de Coyuntura Laboral (ECL) covering the period 1990-96. The unit of study in 
the ECL is the plant. The sectoral coverage is manufacturing and services (excluding 
Public Administration). (2) The first row shows aggregate and disaggregate (tempo-
rary /permanent) job creation, destruction and reallocation rates (averages). The second 
row shows the correlations of these rates with net employment rate. 
GIn Spain, one out of three contracts is temporary, while in the rest of Europe the 
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behavior. First, they allow employment adjustments at a low cost, since the 
associated legal firing costs to temporary jobs are very low7. Second, until 
1994, firms could freely use temporary contracts without having to justify the 
temporary nature of the activity, using the so called" contrato de fomento 
de empleo" 8. 
The introduction of these cheap contracts, joint with the high firing costs 
associated to permanent jobs, has generated a segmented lab or market, where 
workers in permanent jobs have a very low probability of being fired while 
temporary workers suffer the main adjustments. The usual practice has 
been hiring workers on a temporary basis, usually for 3 years (the maximun 
duration allowed), firing them upon contract expiration and, at the same 
time, hiring new temporary workers to fill the same positions. 
In sum, the Spanish labor market may appear quite dynamic just by 
looking at the cyclical behavior of aggregate job creation, destruction and 
reallocation rates, but this might be misleading. On the one hand, firms fire 
permanent workers less than it would be efficient (labor hoarding) and, on 
the other hand, there is segment of the lab or market suffering from excessive 
turnover. 
Trying to rationalize the consequences of these specific features of the 
Spanish labor market is one of the objectives in this paper. For that pur-
pose, we build a model, similar in spirit to the job creation and destruction 
model proposed by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), and introduce some 
new elements to capture those specific features. The first one is the existence 
of a Segmented Labor Market with two types of jobs: permanent and tempo-
rary, differing in the maximum duration of the contract and in the associated 
firing costs9 and held by homogeneous workers. Second, in contrast to pre-
temporary rate is around 8%. 
7In the period under study (1990-96), firing costs are 12 days salary per year worked in 
some temporary contracts and zero in others. Unfair dismissals of workers in permanent 
contracts entail a cost of 45 days salary per year worked with a maximum of 42 monthly 
salaries, while in case of fair dismissals the costs are 20 days salary per year worked with 
a maximum of 12 monthly salaries. 
8The possibility of hiring workers using this type of contract was eliminated in 1994, 
but they have been in place until 1997. 
9We will assume that temporary contracts do not entitle to firing costs, since in most 
cases they are very low or even zero. 
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vious models in this literature, the model is set in discrete time10 . In this 
labor market firms will be heterogeneous agents and will use these two types 
of contracts to adjust their employment levels when facing aggregate and 
idiosyncratic persistent shocks. We follow Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) 
by assuming one-job firms. 
Before going into the details of the model, it is convenient to explain the 
timing and agent's decisions. At the beginning of the period, both aggre-
gate and idiosyncratic shocks affecting firms are revealed. Then, firms and 
workers renegotiate wages. Given new wages, each firm decides whether to 
fire or not its actual worker, taking into account that firing costs depend on 
worker's previous wage. Firms with temporary workers take a similar deci-
sion. However, firms, whose temporary contracts expired last period, decide, 
in fact, whether to convert or not the temporary contract into a permanent 
job, knowing the consequences regarding future firing costs. Once all these 
decisions have been made, production starts both, in firms where workers 
have not been fired this period and in those that were matched with unem-
ployed workers at the end of last period. Finally, search decisions are made: 
firms post vacancies and unemployed workers apply for jobs. This search 
process will generate new matches that will be productive next period. We 
will also assume that every job is created as a temporary job. 
The model is calibrated to the Spanish economy and we test its validity 
to replicate the behavior of job creation and job destruction in that economy. 
In addition, we quantify the effects of a 40% reduction in firing costs for the 
magnitude and cyclical behavior of the variables of interest. Such a reduction 
(i) has negligible effects on the magnitude of permanent job destruction rates, 
(ii) significant effects on job creation and destruction (permanent/temporary) 
cyclical behavior, (iii) increases the job conversion rate by 57% and (iii) 
reduces the temporary employment rate by 12%. Moreover, this simulation 
exercise shows that the aggregate job creation and job destruction statistics 
lOThis is necessary for two reasons. First, firms need to know worker's previous wage 
when considering whether to fire or not a worker, since firing costs are computed using 
this information. That is, worker's previous wage is a state variable. Second, tenure in a 
temporary contract is also a state variable, since temporary contracts have a fixed-term 
duration. 
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can be very similar in a rigid (high firing costs) and in a flexible economy 
(low firing costs). 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review 
previous literature. In Section 3, we present the model. In Section 4, we dis-
cuss its calibration. In Section 5, we show simulation results. In Section 6, 
we comment the results obtained from the reduction in firing costs. Finally, 
Section 7 draws some conclusions. 
2 Related literature 
The pioneer empirical studies in this literature are due to Davis and Halti-
wanger (1990,1992). Using firm-level data, they document the magnitude 
and cyclical behavior of job creation and destruction rates in the US econ-
omy. Among their findings, one of the most interesting is the countercyclical 
behavior of the JR rates. Following Davis and Haltinwanger (DH), a number 
of empirical studies have applied the same methodology to some European 
countries: Boeri y Cramer (1993) for Germany, Contini and Revelli (1987) 
for Italy, Konings (1995) for the United Kingdom (UK), Dolado and G6mez 
(1995) and Garda-Serrano and Jimeno (1997) for Spain. The most relevant 
result from this research program is the acyclical behavior of the JR rates in 
the European economies, except for the UK. 
These differences in the cyclical behavior of JR rates across labor mar-
kets are frequently attributed to differences in employment protection regula-
tionsll . While the job creation technology is slow and costly in both types of 
economy, the job destruction technology is instantaneous in the Anglo-xason 
countries due to lower firing costs. 
At the same time, a number of theoretical studies have been developed 
trying to rationalize the observed facts. The most important contribution is 
the stochastic endogenous job creation and destruction model by Mortensen 
and Pissarides (1994). In this model, the exogenous job destruction rate in 
11 Bentolila y Bertola (1990) y Bertola (1990) conclude that differences in firing costs 
explain differences in the dynamic behavior of employment, but they do not necessarily 
imply a higher unemployment rate 
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the classic search and matching model by Pissarides (1990) is endogenized. 
Subsequently, Pissarides (1994) and Mortensen (1994) introduce on the job 
search. These models are able to reproduce the "stylized facts" observed 
in the US economy: (i) job creation and destruction flows coexisting in all 
phases of the cycle, (ii) a lot of heterogeneity among plants and (iii) a very 
volatile job destruction process. 
However, these models cannot account for the cyclical behavior docu-
mented in the European countries. Garibaldi (1998), in a modified version 
of the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) model, has reproduced the acyclical real-
location rate observed in most European economies by introducing elements 
of employment protection. In his model, job destruction is also endogenous, 
but firms cannot get rid of their labor force instantaneously. The process of 
firing a worker is slow and costly since firms must wait for an administrative 
authorization before firing a worker. 
Garibaldi's model, while able to explain the behavior of job creation and 
job destruction in most European economies, does not look appropriate to 
account for the Spanish facts. Thus, the first goal in this paper is to build 
a model that is able to account for that behaviour. For that purpose, we 
introduce two specific features of the Spanish labor market: (i) the exis-
tence of two types of contracts (permanent and temporary), differing in their 
maximun duration and in firing costs, and (ii) the possibility of converting 
a temporary contract into a permanent one. Modelling the process of job 
creation and job destruction in that way, it is possible to study separately 
the cyclical properties of job creation and destruction by type of contract 
and analyze the effects of a reduction in firing costs associated to permanent 
contracts for permanent job creation and destruction rates. 
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3 Model 
3.1 Population 
The economy consists of a continuum of workers with unit mass12 and a 
continuum of firms. Workers can either be employed or unemployed13 . Un-
employed workers look for employment opportunities; employed workers pro-
duce and do not search on the job. Each firm is a one-job firm. The job might 
be occupied and producing or vacant. 
The source of heterogeneity is due to the existence of matchings with 
different quality levels, durations, and firing costs (that depend on previous 
wage). Therefore, the state space that describes the situation of a particular 
worker is S = {{O, I} x £ x D x [0, w]}, where £ = {El, ... , En} is a discrete 
set, the quality levels, D = {d l , ... , dN } is a discrete set denoting tenure on 
a particular job and wages take values in an interval [0, w]. Therefore, each 
quadruple indicates whether the worker is unemployed (0) or employed (1) 
and, in that case, the quality of the match, worker's tenure and his previous 
wage. Note that the state space is continuos since the wage takes values in 
an interval. 
3.2 Preferences 
Workers have identical preferences, live infinitely and maximize their utility, 
which is taken to be linear in consumption. We assume that they supply 
work inelastically, that is, they will accept every opportunity that arises. 
Thus, each worker has preferences defined by 
00 
L/3tCt 
t=l 
where /3, ° :s; /3 < 1, is the discount factor and Ct is consumption. Firms 
are also risk neutral. 
12We assume a zero population growth rate. 
13We do not considered other labor market states out of the labor force 
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3.3 Technologies 
We assume that there are two technologies in this economy: a production 
and a matching technology. 
3.3.1 Production technology 
Each job is characterized by an irreversible technology and produces one 
unit of a differentiated product per period, whose price is Y(Zt, Et), where 
{zd is an aggregate productivity component, common to every job, and {Et} 
is a specific component, i.e. the quality of the match. Each new matching 
(assumed to be temporary) starts with the same entry level Ee , a relative low 
quality level. From this initial condition, the quality of the match will evolve 
stochastically due to shocks, {Zt, Ed. 
The aggregate shock, {Zt}, is modeled as a statiopary and finite Markov 
chain, with transition probabilities I1(z'lz) = Pr{Zt+l = z'lzt = z} where z, 
z' E Z = {I, 2, ... , nz }. The idiosyncratic component, {Et}, is also modeled 
as a stationary and finite Markov chain. This process is the same for every 
matching and, conditioning on Zt+l' the realizations Et+l are independent and 
identically distributed with conditional transition probabilities 7f(E'ic, z') = 
Pr{ Et+lIEt, zt+d, where E, E' E £ = {I, 2, ... , nE}. Therefore, the joint process 
{E, z} is a Markov chain with nE x nz states with transition probabilities 
In this paper, we assume that both stochastic processes are independent. 
This implies r[(E', Z')I(E, z)] = I1(z'lz) * 7f(E'ic). In addition, we assume that 
agents know the laws of motion of both processes and observe their realiza-
tions at the beginning of the period. 
3.3.2 Matching technology 
As before mentioned, every job is created as a temporary job. Temporary 
jobs are created by firms that post vacancies in the market. We assume 
free entry in the creation of vacancies. Thus, posting a vacancy is not job 
creation, unless it is filled. Finally, there is a cost associated to posting a 
vacancy, c. 
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III 
In each period, vacancies and unemployed workers are stochastically matched. 
We assume the existence of an homogeneous of degree one matching func-
tion m = m(ut, Vt), increasing and concave in both arguments, where Vt is 
the number of vacancies and Ut the number of unemployed workers, both 
normalized by the fixed labor force. The application process is as follows. 
Workers can only apply to one job each period. Given this restriction and 
the assumption that workers supply curve is inelastic, their decision is trivial. 
They will accept a job whenever there is a contact. 
These assumptions allow us to define the transition rates for vacancies 
and unemployed workers. The vacancy transition rate, q, is defined as the 
probability of filling a vacancy and is given by 
q(v) = m(~,u) = m (1,~) 
The transition rate for unemployed workers, a, is defined as the proba-
bility of finding a job and is given by 
a (v) = m (:' u) = m (;, 1 ) 
Given that the homogeneity of degree one in the matching function, these 
transition rates depend only on v = v/u, a measure of tightness in the labor 
market. 
On the other hand, permanent jobs are created when firms decide to 
convert a temporary job into a permanent one. This can be motivated by 
a good realization of the joint process {E, z}. In particular, conversion will 
take place for realizations above a specific threshold that firms determine. 
3.4 Equilibrium 
The concept of equilibrium used is the recursive equilibrium. In each period, 
the aggregate state of the economy is described by the pair (J1, z), where J1 
represents the matching distribution by quality levels, tenure and previous 
wages. In the following I will describe firms and workers problems. 
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3.4.1 Problem of a firm with permanent job 
The vector of states for this firm is (E, W-1, j1, z), where E is the quality of the 
match, W-l the previous wage and the pair (j1, z) represents the aggregate 
state in this economy14. 
The problem of this firm is 
(.I,Z' 
Zl 
s.t. 
where JP(E,W_1,j1,Z) is the firm value function, W(E,W_1,j1,Z) is the 
wage, previously determined in a bilateral negotiation between the firm and 
the worker, cf(w-d is the firing cost, that depends on the previous wage, 
Jt(Ee, d1, j1', z') is the value function of a firm with a first period temporary 
job, J O(j1, z) is the value of a vacancy and the function G(j1, z, z') describes 
the distribution law of motion. 
The decision rule for this firm is denoted by gP ( E, W -1, j1, z) . The firm 
must decide whether to continue with the actual match, gP(E, W-l, j1, z) = 1, 
or whether to fire the worker and look for a new one, gP(E, W-1, j1, z) = o. 
Note that the problem is different for a firm whose temporary contract ex-
pired in the previous period. Let us denote n the maximum number of periods 
for a temporary contract. In this case, the vector of states is (E, dn +1, j1, z), 
14Since the state variable W-l takes values in an interval, the state space, S = { {O, I} x 
[ x D x [0, w]}, is continuum and, the value functions are infinite-dimensional objects. 
There are two approaches to deal with this problem. The first one is to discretize the 
state space, that is, to partition the wage support considering only a finite number of 
wages. The drawback is that the wage is not an exogenous variable, but an endogenous 
one, determined in the bargaining process. Therefore, this approach will be unreliable 
and restrictive, unless the partition is very fine. But then, the problem is that the state 
space increases too much. The other approach consists in partitioning the wage support 
to evaluate the value functions using linear interpolation when the argument W-l falls 
outside the grid. This is the approach followed here, so that the value functions are still 
infinite-dimensional objects and wages are not restricted to take values in a discrete set. 
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"I 
where dn+1 indicates that if the worker is not fired at the beginning of this 
period, this worker will start the subsequent period as a permanent worker. 
His previous wage is not part of the state vector because the firing cost at 
the beginning of the period would be zero. The problem of this firm can be 
written as 
max{y(z, c) - w(c, dn+1, p" z) + (3 L r[(c', z')I(c, z)]JP(c', w, p,', z'), 
f',Z' 
-c + (3q(p" z) L I1(z'lz)Jt (ce, d1, p,', z') + (3(1 - q(p" z))JO} 
Zl 
s.t. 
p,' = G(p" z, z') 
The decision rule is gP( c, dn+1, p" z) = 1 if the firm converts the temporary 
contract into a permanent one and gP(c, dn+1, p" z) = 0 if the firm decides to 
fire the worker and start looking for another one. 
3.4.2 Problem of a firm with a temporary job 
The vector of states for this firm is (c, d, p" z), where d represents tenure at 
the beginning of the period. Note that the previous wage is not part of the 
state vector, since firing costs are zero for this type of contracts. The problem 
of this firm is 
max{y(z, c) - w(c, d, p" z) + (3 L r[(c', z')I(c, z)]Jt(c', d + 1, p,', z'), 
€' ,z' 
-c + (3q(p" z) L I1(z'lz)Y(ce, d1, p,', z') + (3(1 - q(p" z))JO(p" z)} 
Zl 
s.t. 
p,' = G(p" z, z') 
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where P(E, d, IL, z) is the value function for this firm and W(E, d, IL, z) is 
the wage, previously determined in a bilateral negotiation between the firm 
and the worker. 
The firm must decide whether to continue with the match, gt(E, d, IL, z) = 
1, or to fire the worker and look for another one, gt(E, d, IL, z) = o. 
Note that due to the limited duration of temporary contracts to n periods, 
the problem of a firm with a temporary contract in the last period is 
max{y(z, E) - W( E, dn , IL, z) + (3 L r[( E', Zl) I (E, z)]JP( E', dn +1, IL', Zl), 
E' ,z' 
-c + (3Q(IL, z) L II(z'lz)Jt(Ee, d1, IL', Zl) + (3(1 - q(IL, Z))JO(IL, z)} 
Zl 
s.t. 
IL' = G(IL, Z, Zl) 
3.4.3 Problem of a worker in a permanent job 
The problem of this worker is trivial. In fact, his decision is indirect since 
he negotiates with the firm over the wage before the firm decides upon his 
continuation. 
<D(gP = 1) [w( E, W-l, IL, z) + (3 L r[( E', Zl) I (E, z)]VP( E', w, IL', Zl)] 
£' ,z' 
where VP(E, W-l, IL, z) is the value function for this worker, <D(x) is an 
indicator function that takes the value 1 if the assessment is true and zero 
otherwise, and VO(IL, z) is the value function for an unemployed worker. 
3.4.4 Problem of a worker in a temporary job 
His problem is also trivial. 
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€' ,z' 
where vt( E, d, /1, z) is the value function of a worker in a temporary job. 
3.4.5 Problem of an unemployed worker 
Unemployed workers look for employment and accept a job whenever an 
opportunity arises. The value function for an unemployed worker is 
Zl 
;3(1 - a(/1, z)) L II(z'lz)VO(/1', z') 
Zl 
where Vt(Ee, d1, /1', z') is the value function of a temporary worker in his 
first period. The parameter b can be interpreted in two ways. It could be 
some kind of unemployment subsidy. Under this assumption, we would need 
a public sector to raise taxes. The other interpretation is that b is the return 
to home production, assuming that every household have access to the same 
production technology. This technology allows them to produce b units of 
the period consumption good every period. 
3.4.6 Wage determination 
Wages are the result of a bilateral bargaining between the worker and the 
firm. Bargaining is dynamic, that is, wages are revised every period upon 
occurrence of new shocks. This assumption is reasonable due to existence 
of sunk costs (search costs) once the match is produced. This creates local 
monopoly power and generates a surplus to be split among the participants 
in the match. This surplus, in the case of a permanent contract, is defined 
as 
13 
JP(c, W-l, IL, z) - (JO(IL, z) - Cf(W-l)) + 
VP(c, W-l, IL, z) - (VO(IL, z) + Cf(W-l)) 
Wages are obtained by maximizing the following Nash product with re-
spect to the wage 
Wages are set so that the surplus of the match, SP(c, W-l, IL, z), is split in 
fixed proportions. In equilibrium 
where 0 indicates workers bargaining power. 
In general, the determination of wages using dynamic bargaining implies 
having to solve a fix point problem, since the value functions that define the 
surplus to be maximized depend on the wage. However, in this case, it is 
possible to avoid this computational problem. The assumption of free entry 
in the creation of vacancies allow us to obtain an expression for the wage 
from the first order condition that only depends on the transition rates for 
a vacancy and a worker and on parameters. That expression is independent 
of the value functions and is given by 
[ 
ca(z)] 
w(c, W-l, z) = (1 - O)b + 0 y(c, z) + q(z) + (1 - /3)Cf(W-l) 
Wages associated to temporary contracts are obtained by maximizing a 
similar expression, where cf(w-d=O. 
14 
3.4.7 Definition of Equilibrium 
A recursive equilibrium is a list of value functions JP(E, W-l, j1, z), JP(E, dn+1, j1, z), 
P(E, d, j1, z), VP(E, W-l, j1, z), VP(E, dn+1, j1, z), Vt(E, d, j1, z), JO(j1, z), VO(j1, z), 
transition rates q(j1, z), a(j1, z), prices W(E, W-l, j1, z), W(E, d, j1, z), decision 
rules gP(E, W-l, j1, z), gP(E, dn+1 , j1, z) and gt(E, d, j1, z) and a law of motion for 
the aggregate state G(j1, z, z') such that 
1. Optimality: Given the functions q(j1, z), a(j1, z), W(E, W-l, j1, z) and 
W(E, d, j1, z), the value functions JP(E, W-l, j1, z), JP(E, dn+1, j1, z), P(E, d, j1, z), 
VP(E, W-l, j1, z), VP(E, dn+1 , j1, z) and Vt(E, d, j1, z) satisfy the Bellman 
equations. 
2. Free entry: This condition and the profit maximization condition guar-
antee that in equilibrium the number of vacancies adjust to eliminate 
all rents associated to holding a vacancy; that is, JO(j1, z) = 0, implying 
Zl 
3. Wage bargaining: The equilibrium conditions from maximizing the sur-
plus are 
4. Rational expectations: Individual decisions generate a distribution over 
tomorrow's aggregate state that is equivalent to the distribution implied 
by G(j1, z, z'). 
In this literature it is usual to concentrate only on equilibria where wages 
do not depend on the unemployment rate. We will follow this practice. 
Wages will depend on the aggregate shock but they will be independent of 
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the distribution. The fact that such an equilibrium might exists is due to 
the timing and the assumption of free entry in the creation of vacancies. 
Wages do not depend on the unemployment rate because this is not the 
variable of interest for workers, but the rate at which workers find jobs, Q:. 
By homogeneity of the matching function, Q: depends on v/u and on the 
aggregate state z. But v/u is unknown when bargaining takes place, so that 
wages will only depend on the aggregate shock. That is, vacancies are not a 
state variable, they are forward-looking variables, unknown when bargaining 
is taking place. 
The possibility of concentrating in this type of equilibria, in which the 
variables of interest are independent of the distribution is very useful because 
we do not need to deal with the aggregate uncertainty introduced in the 
model15 . 
4 Calibration 
In this section we explain the procedure we use to assign values to the pa-
rameters of the model and the selection of functional forms. The calibration 
consists on assigning values to parameters such that the model economy is 
able to replicate certain statistics in the real economy. In practice, most 
researchers do not use any optimization procedure to guarantee that this 
occurs. Sometimes, researchers even use estimates from the empirical liter-
ature. In this work we use two procedures. For the parameters that have a 
clear counterpart in the real economy we use the implied values. For the rest, 
we prefer not to use arbitrary estimations and we use the simulated method 
of moments. This optimization method consists in finding the values that 
minimize the distance between the statistics of the model economy and those 
of the real economy. 
15For a discussion about the problem of aggregate uncertainty in models with heteroge-
neous agents see the chapter by Victor Rios-Rull in Cooley(1995). 
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4.1 Model period 
We use firm-level data from the survey "Encuesta de Coyuntura Laboral". 
This is a quarterly data set covering the period 1990-96. The model period 
must be chosen such that it is consistent with the average duration of unem-
ployment and reasonable from a computation point of view. Hence, we have 
chosen a quarter. 
4.2 Preferences 
The utility function is linear in consumption as usual in this literature. The 
value of the discount factor f3 is fixed such that it is consistent with the mean 
annual real interest rate in the reference period, 6%. Therefore, the implied 
f3 is 0.985. 
4.3 Production technology 
The production function is additive in the idiosyncratic and in the aggregate 
shocks Y(E, z) = E + z. 
One of the statistics that we want to approximate is the share of aggre-
gate consumption in output. In the model, aggregate consumption is the 
output generated by firms plus household production less the costs of offer-
ing vacancies in the market. Output in the model economy does not include 
either a public or a external sector. We assume this value is approximately 
0.85. Another statistic that we want to approximate is the wage share. This 
number is 0.65 in the Spanish economy. 
The optimization procedure generates the following values for the two pa-
rameters related to these statistics: c = 0.15 and () = 0.15. Previous studies 
have used values for c in the range 0.2 - 0.3, not very different from the esti-
mated value here, and the bargaining parameter has been set to 0.5 because 
of lack of information. Abowd and Lemieux (1993) estimate a value 0.3 for (). 
Aggregate shock parameters 
The aggregate shock is modeled as a Markov chain. We assume that the 
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process can just take two values, {Zl' Z2}, where Zl is the value in recessions 
and Z2 the value in expansions. In addition, we assume that the expected 
duration of expansions and recessions coincide. This implies that II(Zllz2) = 
II(Z2Iz1) and, therefore, it is only necessary to calibrate one parameter in the 
transition matrix. 
To calibrate the aggregate process we use the equivalence between an 
autorregresive process AR(I) and a first order Markov process. We define a 
first order Markov process with the same moments that the autorregresive 
process and use the estimations of the coefficient of correlation, p, and the 
standard deviation of the shock, (Jv, to calibrate the two values of the shock 
and the parameter in the transition matrix. 
To obtain these estimations, we use quarterly GDP per employee in the 
period 1970-1998. The estimated values are p = 0.76 y (Jv = 0.006. These 
values imply Zl = 0.015, Z2 = -0.015 y IIz(Zllzl) = 0.88. 
Transition Matrix for the quality of the match 
We assume that the idiosyncratic shock is independent of the aggregate 
process. This implies r[(E', Z')I(E, z)] = II(z'lz) * 7r(E'IE). In addition, we 
assume that there are five possible quality levels. In general, this two as-
sumptions would imply that we need to impose 16 restrictions to fix the 
values of the conditional transition probabilities between different quality 
levels. 
Given that we do not have direct information on the quality of the match 
or on tenure, we use Tauchen's procedure16 to parametrize the five quality 
match values, as well as the transition probability values. To apply this 
procedure we need to know the mean, standard deviation and auto correlation 
coefficient of the underlying idiosyncratic process. These parameters are 
obtained in the optimization procedure. 
16See Tauchen (1986) 
18 
"I 
4.4 Household production technology 
The return to household production represents the value of time for the 
household when not working in the market. The parameter b could be set 
such that it is 15 - 20% of the lowest wage in the economy. Since wages 
are determined endogenously in the model, we prefer to obtain b from the 
optimization procedure, instead of imposing any a priori value. The value 
that results is b = 0.004, which is 14% of the lowest wage in the economy. 
4.5 Matching technology 
The matching function m = m(vt, Ut) is a Cobb-Douglas homogeneous of 
degree one function, m = m(v, u) = A * VTJ(U)l-TJ. The scale parameter A 
reflects the degree of mismatch in the economy and TJ is the value for the 
elasticity of the number of matches with respect to vacancies. 
From the optimization procedure we obtain the following numbers: 77 = 
0.4 y A=0.2. The value for 77 is congruent with the estimations in empirical 
studies in the range 0.4 - 0.6. 
4.6 Firing costs 
In the period under study, firing a permanent worker entails a cost of 45 
days salary per year worked with a maximum of 42 monthly salaries if the 
dismissal is declared unfair. To compute the equilibrium we need a firing 
cost function that depends on previous wage and reflects the average firing 
cost in the real economy. Bentolila (1997) estimates that 72% of all firing 
processes are declared unfair and that the average cost is around 1.5 million 
pesetas. 
The firing cost function used to compute the equilibrium is cf = 3.5w_l. 
For instance, firing a permanent worker with seven years tenure will entail 
315 days salary. Given that the model period is a quarter, w corresponds 
to 90 days salary and 3.5w-l would be the amount to be paid for 315 days. 
Assuming that the average monthly wage is around 150.000 pesetas, 3.5w-l 
would imply a total cost of 1.575.000 pesetas, which is approximately the 
average firing cost. 
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In sum, the calibration involves the assignment of values to two types of 
parameters. The discount rate and the parameters of the aggregate process 
are the only ones that are set independently of the rest since they have clear 
counterparts in the real economy. The remaining parameters, the transition 
matrix parameters for the quality of the match, the cost of open a vacancy 
ee, the elasticity of new matches with respect to the vacancy input 'T}, the 
scale parameter in the matching function A, workers bargaining power () and 
the household production parameter b, are obtained using the method of 
simulated moments 17. 
5 Simulation results 
Tables 4,5 and 6 show simulation results18 . To compute the model statistics 
we have generated series of job creation and destruction rates (aggregate 
and disaggregate by type of contract), temporary employment rates, job 
conversion rates and wage and consumption shares. Then, we have computed 
means, standard deviations and the correlations of interest for each of the 
50 simulations of 50 periods of length each. And finally, we have computed 
means and standard deviations of these statistics. Since all variables are 
stationary, it is not necessary to detrend the series to make the calculations. 
Table 4 shows that the model is able to replicate the means of job creation 
and job destruction rates. This is true both, for aggregate and permanent 
employment, while it falls short when replicating the rates of temporary job 
creation and job destruction 19. In addition, the model is able to reproduce 
the means of temporary employment and job conversion rates. 
l7The process is the following. Starting with some initial values, the optimization rou-
tine calls a subroutine that computes the equilibrium and the statistics. If the statistics 
generated by the model are suffiCiently close to the real ones, the program ends. Other-
wise, the optimization routine modifies the initial parameter values in some direction and 
calls again the subroutine that computes the equilibrium, and so on. 
18 All the statistics are quaterly. 
19Note that the model has been calibrated to match job creation rates, both aggregate 
and disaggregate, the wage share, the consumption share, the correlation between the 
conversion rate and GDP growth rate, the correlation between the job reallocation rate 
and GDP growth rate and the correlation between temporary job creation and destruction 
rates. 
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Table 4· Means 
Statistics Simulated Model Spanish Data 
Aggregate Job creation rate (JC) 3.72 2.72 
Aggregate Job destruction rate (JD) 3.77 3.21 
Permanent creation rate (JOP) 2.25 2.76 
Permanent destruction rate (J DP) 2.19 3.08 
Temporary creation rate (Jot) 8.36 11.9 
Temporary destruction rate (J Dt) 8.56 13.1 
Temporary employment rate 28.78 30.0 
Conversion rate 4.16 3.0 
Wage share 70.0 65.0 
Consumption share 79.49 85.0 
To study the cyclical behavior of job creation and job destruction we have 
used various indicators. First, we have computed relative standard deviations 
of job creation and job destruction, both for aggregate and disaggregate (per-
manent/temporary) employment. As Table 5 shows, the model is consistent 
with the fact that job destruction rates are more volatile than job creation 
rates for both types of employment. However, the relative volatility of tem-
porary employment is too low and that of permanent employment too high. 
Table 5· Relative standard deviations 
Statistics Simulated Model Spanish data 
ReI. std. dev. JD y JO CJ"JD) 
UJe 
1.61 1.79 
ReI. std. dev. J DP y JOP (UJDP) 1.4 1.17 
UJCP 
ReI. std. dev. J Dt y Jot (UJDt) 1.3 1.55 
U.Jn t 
The second indicator to look at the cyclical behavior of job creation and 
destruction is the correlation of these rates with net employment rate (NET), 
an indicator of the cycle. The first two rows in Table 6 show the correlations 
of aggregate job creation and destruction rates with NET. They are quite 
similar to the observed in the data and confirm the" stylized fact" that the 
job reallocation process is more intense in recessions than in expansions. 
Table 6 also shows the correlations of permanent job creation and de-
struction with the cycle. The correlation of permanent job creation must 
be analyzed with some care. The reason is that there are important differ-
ences between the process of permanent job creation in this model and in 
the real economy. First, permanent job creation is only possible via conver-
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sion of temporary contracts into permanent jobs, since every job starts as 
temporary; and second, firms do not have incentives to convert temporary 
contracts into permanent jobs prior to their expiration (3 years). These two 
features of the model play against a more pro cyclical reaction of permanent 
job creation in response to a positive shock2o . 
In any case, it is possible to test the ability of the model to replicate the 
cyclical behavior of permanent job creation by looking at the appropriate 
statistic, i.e. the job conversion rate. Hence, Table 6 also shows the corre-
lation of the job conversion rate (JCconv) with NET. This correlation is, in 
fact, very close to the observed in the data. Finally, the cyclical behavior of 
permanent job destruction is also consistent. 
Regarding the cyclical behavior of temporary job creation and destruc-
tion, job creation is too pro cyclical and job destruction is not so counter-
cyclical as in the data. There are two reasons explaining the latter result. 
First, in the model job conversion implies temporary job destruction; and 
second, most temporary job destruction happens upon temporary contracts 
expiration. Both features bias the correlation of temporary job destruction 
downwards. In fact, this correlation improves by substracting from tempo-
rary job destruction the component due to job conversion. 
Table 6· Correlations with NET 
Statistics Simulated Model Spanish Data 
Correlation (JC,NET) 0.38 0.60 
Correlation (JD,NET) -0.54 -0.89 
Correlation (J CP ,NET) -0.1 0.24 
Correlation (JCconv,NET) -0.09 0.04 
Correlation (J DP ,NET) -0.38 -0.48 
Correlation (J Ct , NET) 0.63 0.44 
Correlation (J Dt , NET) -0.34 -0.70 
In sum, the model is able to replicate the means and cyclical behavior of 
job creation and destruction rates both, for aggregate and permanent employ-
200ne way to get a pro cyclical rate of permanent job creation is by allowing workers to 
search on the job and firms to hire workers directly on a permanent basis. Another way is 
by incorporating an assumption of the efficiency wage type. These assumptions would be 
enough to give firms incentives to convert contracts prior to expiration when the quality 
of the match is above a reservation level. 
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ment. However, it fails to reproduce the absolute values of the correlations 
of temporary job creation and destruction with the cycle. 
6 Effects of a reduction in firing costs 
The goal in this section is to quantify the effects of a 40% reduction in the 
firing costs associated with permanent contracts, i.e. from the mandated 45 
days salary per year worked (in the period under consideration) to 25 days 
salary per year worked. 
Tables 7 shows that the effects on the means of job creation and destruc-
tion rates are negligible. At first sight, this result could seem surprising, 
since it contradicts one of the main conclusions from the partial equilibrium 
lab or demand literature 21. According to this literature, one would expect 
an increase in permanent job creation and destruction after a reduction in 
the firing costs associated with these contracts. However, two features of the 
model, the wage determination process and the way permanent job creation 
takes place (job conversion), help shed some light on this result. 
Permanent job destruction rates do not increase because neither the op-
portunity cost of continuing with the match nor the opportunity cost of 
breaking it changes. 
Regarding permanent job creation, the behavior of the job conversion rate 
agrees with the predictions of the above mentioned models. The decrease in 
the firing costs improves firms's bargaining position, lowering wages and, 
therefore, increasing the incentives to convert jobs from temporary into per-
manent. In fact, the job conversion rate increases substantially, from 4% to 
6.5%. 
The most relevant effects of the reduction in firing costs are (i) a 11.6% 
reduction in the temporary employment rate, from 29% to 25.5% and (ii) 
a 57% increase in the job conversion rate from temporary into permanent 
contracts, from 4% to 6.5% (see table 7). 
21See Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994), Bertola (1990, 
1992) and Nickell (1978, 1986). 
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Table 7· Means 
Statistics Model cf high Model cf low 
Aggregate Job creation rate (JC) 3.72 3.55 
Aggregate Job destruction rate (JD) 3.77 3.55 
Permanent job creation rate (JCP) 2.25 2.13 
Permanent Job destruction rate (JDP) 2.19 2.04 
Temporary job creation rate (JCt ) 8.36 9.07 
Temporary job destruction rate (J Dt) 8.56 9.06 
Temporary employment rate 28.78 25.45 
Conversion rate 4.16 6.53 
Table 8 shows The cyclical behavior of job creation and destruction rates 
before and after the reduction in firing costs. Permanent employment is 
more sensible to the cycle after this reduction, while temporary job creation 
and destruction evolve in the opposite way. The reason is clear. Since per-
manent workers are now easier to fire, firms will try to reallocate when the 
opportunity cost (in terms of loss output) is lower, that is, in recessions. 
Tabla 8: Correlations with net employment rate 
Statistics Model cf high Model cf low 
Correlation (JC, NET) 0.38 0.40 
Correlation (JD,NET) -0.54 -0.51 
Correlation (J CP , NET) -0.1 -0.04 
Correlation (J DP , NET) -0.38 -0.45 
Correlation (J ct, NET) 0.63 0.61 
Correlation (J Dt , NET) -0.34 -0.14 
Last, this exercise confirms the puzzle presented in the beginning. That 
is, a high firing cost economy (rigid economy) may offer the same aggregate 
statistics than a low firing cost economy (flexible economy). The reason is 
that the reduction in firing costs affects differently the cyclical behavior of 
permanent and temporary employment (see Table 8). Temporary employ-
ment is no longer used as an adjustment mechanism but, instead, is simply 
used as a screening device. In fact, as we have seen in this exercise, the in-
crease in the job conversion rate from temporary into permanent employment 
is one of the most significant effects. 
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7 Conclusions 
In this paper we have accomplished two goals. The first was to build a 
model that is able to replicate the Spanish labor market facts concerning 
job creation and destruction. The second was to quantify the effects of a 
reduction in the firing costs associated with permanent contracts. 
The motivation of the paper was the surprising similarity between Spanish 
and US aggregate statistics (job creation and destruction rates), resembling 
very efficient labor markets, despite the obvious differences in labor protec-
tion laws. As shown in Section 6, it is possible that an economy characterized 
by (i) high firing costs associated to permanent contracts, (ii) segmentation 
in the labor market, (iii) excessive turnover, (iv) high temporary rates and 
(v) low job conversion rates from temporary into permanent contracts offers 
the same aggregate statistics than a flexible economy, characterized by low 
firing costs. Hence, the countercyclical behavior of the Spanish job realloca-
tion rate cannot be attributed to the existence of negligible firing costs, as 
argued in most studies when comparing job reallocation rates across US and 
European labor markets, but to the existence of temporary contracts that 
have opened a way to circumvent them. 
Once the model was able to replicate reasonably well the behavior of 
Spanish job creation and job destruction rates, we performed a simulation 
exercise consisting of a 40% reduction in the firing costs associated with 
permanent contracts. The main effects were a decrease in the temporary 
employment rate from 29% to %25.5 and an increase in the job conversion 
rate from 4% to 6.5%. In this flexible economy (low firing costs), temporary 
employment is no longer used as an adjustment mechanism since permanent 
employment has become cheaper, but as a screening device. Note that these 
two effects, the decrease in the temporary rate and the increase in the job 
conversion rate have important implications for workers productivity, since 
excessive turnover prevents workers from acquiring firm specific skills. 
The most surprising result was the negligible effect on the permanent 
job destruction rate. However, once we take into account the way wages 
are determined, it is reasonable that permanent job destruction does not 
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increase after the reduction in firing costs. On the other hand, the effects on 
the permanent job creation rate (the job conversion rate in this model) are 
coherent with the predictions from the partial equilibrium models of labor 
demand. 
Finally, job creation and destruction cyclical behavior changed as ex-
pected. Permanent job reallocation became more countercyclical while tem-
porary job reallocation reacted in the opposite way. The fact that permanent 
employment became cheaper after the reduction in firing costs, made firms re-
allocate more efficiently. That is, job reallocation was mostly accomplished in 
recessions, when the opportunity costs, in terms of output losses, was lower. 
This model has mainly two limitations. First, it would be desirable to 
introduce on the job search to get correlations more similar to the observed in 
the data. For instance, the permanent job reallocation rate and the perma-
nent relative standard deviations in the model are too high. This is because 
firms are not allowed to hire permanent workers directly and there is no on 
the job search. These elements would make job creation more pro cyclical 
and, as a consequence, the job reallocation rate would be less countercycli-
cal, as in the data. Second, the way wages are determined weakens the effects 
of the reduction in firing costs on job creation and job destruction. 
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